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Abstract

Economics, Politics and the Environment
by
Ron Joseph Mandelbaum
Advisor: Christa Altenstetter
Classical economists were interested in macroeconomic issues, i.e. how the economy worked as a whole
and how it grew over time. This is opposed to neo-classical economists, which focus on decision-making
processes of individuals and individual firms. This thesis sets out to examine how that change occurred and
what it means for the way that economics studies the environment. In order to provide a partial answer to
this question, this paper describes the different outlooks between classical and neo-classical economists
regarding value. It also examines and contrasts the economic approaches of Marx and Mill, whose way of
thinking about social phenomena is still very relevant today. It also highlights the changes in scientific
thought that occurred at the turn of the 20th century and how they affected economics.
When these disparate aspects of economic thought and their development are considered together it
becomes clearer why and how the environment is treated when economic analyses is applied to it. This is
the case both in terms of explaining phenomena and in terms of the policy tools that economic theory and
its application offer. It also becomes more clear how analysis of the environment developed over the last
couple of centuries and that each development was based on previous modes of thought.
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Introduction
How does economics study the environment? This paper will attempt to answer
this question; at least partially so. In order to do so it will explain the distinct ways in
which classical and neo-classical economists consider value and it will contrast the
economic approaches of Marx and Mill, both of whose way of thinking about social
phenomena can still be discerned in today’s social science. It will also highlight the
changes in scientific thought that occurred at the turn of the 20th century and show how
all of these, when considered together, can provide helpful context to answering the
question above.
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Background
The birth of Economics as a separate discipline is usually dated to 1776 when
Adam Smith published "The Wealth of Nations". In Smith’s "The Wealth of Nations",
various methods of reasoning are used. For instance, Chapter I: "Of the Division of
Labor", could be seen as an early utilization of comparative statics whereas Chapter III:
"Of the Origin and Use of Money", is more in line with a historical method.
Ricardo, another highly influential figure in classical economics, writing in the
beginning of the 19th century, departed from Smith in his method as he focused on
analytical construction. While Smith's procedure was comprised of a combination
between analytic methods, enclosed within a framework of historical analysis, Ricardo
focused his work on constructing an analytical structure based on logical rigor and
precision, discarding anything from the analysis considered not directly relevant to the
problem at hand. This also led him to focus on a less general topic, namely surplus rents
and profits, as opposed to Smith who concentrated on the evolution of the economic
system as a whole (Roncaglia, 2001).
While questions regarding economic methodology existed, specific treatment
of these questions did not arise until the decade following Ricardo's death in 1823.
Nassau William Senior's "Introductory Lecture on Political Economy", which discussed
economic methodology, was published in 1826. In 1836, an updated version of Senior’s
original work titled "Outline of the Science of Political Economy" was published as
well as John Stuart Mill's essay "On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the
Method of Investigation Proper to It".1
One of the main characteristics of this era of economic literature was that
economists began to interpret themselves, to rationalize their own aims and procedures
1 The fact that these are the first methodological texts referred to posits that earlier economists did not
state them explicitly (Blaug, 1992).
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- perhaps a sign of the growth of economics into an established science, and, as such,
interested in questions of both method and scope (Schumpeter, 1994).
Senior was the first to make the distinction between a science (theoretical) and
an art (practical) of economics. In his 1826 essay, "Introductory Lecture on Political
Economy", Senior states that the
"…theoretic branch, that which explains the nature, production, and distribution
of wealth, will be found to rest on a very few general propositions, which are the result
of observation, or consciousness, and which almost every man, as soon as he hears
them, admits, as familiar to his thoughts, or at least, as included in his previous
knowledge... Many of its premises [the practical branch], indeed, rest on the same
evidence as those of the first branch; for they are the conclusion of that branch: - but it
has many which depend on induction from phenomena, numerous, difficult of
enumeration, and of which the real sequence often differs widely from the apparent
one." (Senior quoted in Bowley, 1937).
Senior goes on to state that there are four basic tenets to the theoretic branch:
every person desires to obtain as much wealth as possible, with as little sacrifice as
possible; population tends to grow faster than the means of subsistence; capital and
labor together could produce a positive net product; and "That agricultural skill
remaining the same, additional Labor employed on the land within a given district
produces in general a less proportionate return, or, in other words, that though, with
every increase of the labor bestowed, the aggregate return is increased, the increase of
the return is not in proportion to the increase in labor" (Ibid.). Senior derives his tenets
by deduction - the first two mirror "human nature" and the latter two are based on
empirical observation.
In both Smith and Ricardo, there are no real references to environmental issues
although they do allude to the problem of the supply of public goods. For example,
Adam Smith understood that there were limits to markets as
“…erecting and maintaining certain publick works and certain public
institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of
individuals to erect or maintain; because the profit would never repay the expense to
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any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more
than repay it to a great society.” (Smith, 2003).
Clear definitions of market failure and potential remediating policies would not
come until later. While these economists were interested in the limits of growth, the
driving force of their approach was population growth affecting economic
consequences through redistribution of economic returns. Absolute resource constraints
were unnecessary for their approach/theory (Spash, 1999). Malthus, a member of the
classical school, was concerned with such issues. Per his theory of population,
population increases exponentially while agriculture had decreasing returns (see last
Senior tenet above). Thus, per Malthus, a reciprocal relationship between man and
environment exists and population growth would bring about forces that would
inevitably hold it in check (Sandmo, 2014).

To summarize, and generalize, classical economists were interested in
macroeconomic issues, i.e. how the economy worked as a whole and how it grew over
time. This is opposed to neo-classical economics, which focuses on decision-making
processes of individuals and individual firms (Lumby, 2007). How did that change
occur and what does it mean for the way that economics studies the environment?
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Value in the Classical Era
According to Schumpeter “the problem of Value must always hold the pivotal
position, as the chief tool of analysis in any pure theory that works with a rational
schema.” (Schumpeter, 1994). Given that economics, and its theories, is the discipline
that concentrates on how rational agents make rational decisions it makes sense to
explore the building block of these theories, i.e. value. This section will be followed by
two sections about classical political economists, Mill and Marx. While both based their
respective approaches to social science / economics on value, they advanced very
different interpretations of these phenomena.
Classical political economists were not all agreed on how to measure value.
However2, they distinguished between a market and natural price. They maintained that
subjective desires and scarcity are important factors in determining market (or
temporary or short-run) prices, but they also insisted that the natural (or equilibrium or
long-run) prices were determined solely by relative costs of production (usually,
relative labor costs). Furthermore, they made the distinction between reproducible and
non-reproducible goods with the focus of theory being on reproducible goods.
Heertje (2006), elaborates on Ricardo's distinction between reproducible and
non-reproducible goods. Non-reproducible goods, like a Rembrandt painting, have a
unique characteristic - they cannot be replicated. According to Ricardo, demand cannot
explain their prices for it is unpredictable. On the other hand, reproducible goods have
a natural price determined by their reproduction costs. When comparing this
perspective to the utility theory of value, which is the base of neo-classical economic
theory, it is interesting to think about the environment as being a non-reproducible
good.

2Based

on Sowell (1974), however, this is a simplification.
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Although classical economists differed in their interpretation of how to best
measure value, they agreed on how to define it. The price of competitively sold
commodities produced at constant cost was determined by their cost of production,
while commodities produced at increasing cost were sold at marginal cost.
Commodities which were sold in noncompetitive markets and those that were in fixed
supply (non-reproducible for instance) were sold at prices determined by supply and
demand (Sowell, 1974.). Supply and demand was the “general mechanism through
which any particular determinant of value operated”. Thus, supply and demand was the
regulating mechanism of price (Ibid.).
Classical economists considered supply and demand as a causally neutral
mechanism, similar in its neutrality to money, through which other variables
determined value (Ibid.). According to Smith
"The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of
purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be
called 'value in use'; the other, 'value in exchange'. The things which have the greatest
value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those
which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use.
Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce anything; scarce anything
can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use;
but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it."
(Smith, 2003).

To Smith "The value of any commodity... to the person who possesses it, and
who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities,
is equal to the quantity of labor which it enables him to purchase or command. Labor,
therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities" (Smith,
2003).
Mill, also reasoning according to such a labor theory of value, focused his
attention on exchange value, for to Mill, “Value in use, or as Mr. De Quincey calls it,
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teleologic value, is the extreme limit of value in exchange… The word Value, when
used without adjunct, always means, in political economy, value in exchange… By the
price of a thing, therefore we shall henceforth understand its value in money; by the
value, or exchange value of a thing, its general power of purchasing; the command
which its possession gives over purchasable commodities in general.” (Mill, 2004). Mill
emphasized that for economic theory the term value was essentially relative and that it
meant only the exchange ratio between any two commodities or services. Price signified
the exchange ratio between the (arbitrary) unit of any commodity and the good selected
for money. According to Mill: “…the mere introduction of a particular mode of
exchanging things for one another, by first exchanging a thing for money, and then
exchanging the money for something else, makes no difference in the essential
character of transactions… The relations of commodities to one another remain
unaltered by money… Money is a commodity, and its value is determined like that of
other commodities, temporarily by demand and supply, permanently and on the average
by cost of production.” (Ibid.).
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Mill's Political Economy
Mill, in his paper "On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method
of Investigation Proper to It" (Mill, 1968), maintains that economics is a branch of the
science of speculative politics. As such, it does not treat the whole of man's nature as
modified by the social state or of the conduct of man within society. Political Economy
is based on a narrow perspective; knowingly it creates "fictional man" who is
conceptualized
"solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging
of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end… It makes entire
abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except those which may be
regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely,
aversion to labor, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences… The
science then proceeds to investigate the laws which govern these several operations."
(Ibid).
Mill adds the following caveat: "Not that any political economist was ever so
absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the
mode that in which science must necessarily proceed" (Ibid.).
In his discussion of methodology, Mill3 introduces the deductive or method a
priori. This method would dominate economic thought with regard to theory appraisal
and practice until the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Vienna Circle started
to influence scientific thought (Blaug, 1992). In many ways, however, Mill’s influence
is still very much felt today. Mill distinguishes between two types of “reasoners” and
between two inductive methods. The first are termed practical and the second theorists
though both consult experience. The difference between the two is that:
“those who are called practical men require specific experience, and argue
wholly upwards from particular facts to a general conclusion; while those who are
called theorists aim at embracing a wider field of experience, and, having argued
upwards from particular facts to a general principle including a much wider range than
that of the question under discussion, then argue downwards from that general principle
to a variety of specific conclusions.” (Mill, 1968).
3

Mill’s “Principles of Political Economy” would become the standard economics textbook until the turn of
the century when Marshall’s “Principles of Economics” replaced it.
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The first method of induction is the method a posteriori while the second is the
method a priori. In order to arrive at a conclusion using the method a posteriori one
needs not merely experience, but a specific experience. On the other hand, for the
method a priori, one needs an hypothesis; this, to Mill, is “the essence of all science
which admits to general reasoning at all” (Ibid.). Therefore, according to Mill: “Political
economy reasons from assumed premises…premises which might be totally without
foundation in fact … The conclusions of Political Economy, consequently, like those
of geometry, are only true…in the abstract; that is, they are only true under certain
suppositions…” (Ibid.).
The difference between the method a priori and the method a posteriori is that
the method a priori is an indirect inductive method. One first determines the laws
governing individual causal factors.4 Having then determined the laws of the individual
causes, one investigates their combined consequences deductively, each one on its own
and then together. The last step is verifying the combined consequences. This testing
serves as an indicator of whether any disturbing causes were not accounted for. This is
where the method a posteriori comes in, it serves to verify. (Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2012). Mill defines disturbing causes as follows: given that assumptions
(reached by a deductive method of introspection utilizing psychological premises and
abstracting from all noneconomic behavior (Blaug, 1992)) of a theory are correct, and
correct conclusions are deduced from these assumptions, then these “would be as true
in the abstract as those of mathematics; and would be as near an approximation as
abstract truth can ever be…” (Mill, 1968). However, disturbing causes may exist and

4The

"laws" that one finds in Classical Political Economy are "Tendency Laws". According to Mill, a
tendency is "a power acting with a certain intensity" in a certain "direction" (Mill, 1968). For an elaborate
explanation of “Tendency Laws” see (Blaug, 1992) p. 59. Two of Marx's main arguments relied on
assumptions related to tendencies: Marx, in both the analytical and historical sense, states that the
increasing misery of the proletariat is brought about because the workers' share of the output declines;
Marx also postulates the analytical tendency of the falling of the rate of profits (Sowell, 1974).
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may not have fallen under the cognizance of the researcher. The political economist at
this point must take them into account, “the disturbing causes … like friction in
mechanics, to which they have often been compared… have their laws, as the cause
which are thereby disturbed have theirs; and from the laws of the disturbing causes, the
nature and amount of the disturbance may be predicted a priori… The effect of the
special causes is then to be added to, or subtracted from, the effect of the general ones.”
(Ibid.). The disturbing causes are, according to Mill, the only element of uncertainty in
the process “an uncertainty inherent to the nature of these complex phenomena, and
arising from the impossibility of being quite sure that all the circumstances of the
particular case are known to us sufficiently in detail…” (Ibid.). Mill likens disturbing
causes to friction in mechanics and they too can be predicted a priori. Because these
effects are measurable, one may add or subtract them from the general ones. Mill
maintains that we can never be assured that we have taken all factors into account, for
“If the knowledge what are the particular causes operating in any given instance were
revealed to us by infallible authority, then, if our abstract science were perfect, we
should become profits. But the causes are not so revealed: they are to be collected by
observation; and observation in circumstances of complexity is apt to be imperfect.”
(Ibid.).
With regard to verifying theory, Mill maintains that:
"The discrepancy between our anticipations and the actual fact is often
the only circumstance which would have drawn our attention to some important
disturbing cause which we had overlooked. Nay, it often discloses to us errors
in thought, still more serious than the omission of what can with any propriety
be termed a disturbing cause. It often reveals to us that the basis itself of our
whole argument is insufficient; that the data, from which we had reasoned,
comprise only a part, and not always the important part, of the circumstances
by which the result is really determined." (Ibid.)
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Mill advances verification of theory but he is not positing that a failure to verify
a prediction should lead to a refutation of the underlying theory (Blaug, 1992). Given
such an occurrence, a theory should not be discarded; it is only "insufficient".
Mill then states the method of the practical philosopher that consists of two
processes: the first analytical, the second synthetic. The practical philosopher must
analyze society’s elements. Then, they must discern the different laws and their natural
effects, each separately. Then, they must collect them to determine the effect of all the
causes acting at once. Mill stresses the fact that this cannot be done completely because
"mankind can never predict with absolute certainty, but only with a less or greater
degree of probability." (Mill, 1968).
In his book “A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive” (Mill, 2006), Mill
discerns between two kinds of sociological inquiry. The first one (as elaborated upon
above) deals with phenomena examined through cause and effect. The second inquiry
has to do with “…the laws which determine those general circumstances themselves…
what are the causes which produce, and the phenomena which characterize, States of
Society generally.” (Ibid.). For Mill, the study of society is concerned with “intellectual
and moral culture, existing in the community, and in every class of it; the state of
industry, of wealth and its distribution; the habitual occupations of the community; their
division into classes, and the relations of those classes to one another…” (Ibid.). Mill
goes on to critically discuss a method of philosophizing in the social sciences which
has “been of late years erected”, and that attempts “by a study and analysis of the
general facts of history, to discover, (what these philosophers term), the laws of
progress: which law, once ascertained, must according to them enable us to predict
future events…” (Ibid.). However, Mill charges these philosophers with “a fundamental
misconception of the true method of the social philosophy. The misconception consists

11

in supposing that the order of succession which we may be able to trace amount the
different states of society and civilization which history presents to us… could ever
amount to a law of nature. It can only be an empirical law.” (Ibid.).
According to Blaug (Blaug, 1992), classical economists believed that true
assumptions result in true conclusions, whereas simplified assumptions – as Mill
knowingly makes with regard to economic man for example – lead to simplified
conclusions and predictions. Disturbing causes are in fact substantive to the explanation
of phenomena. Testing the application of theory determines whether enough of the
disturbing causes are taken into account in the theory. Validity of a theory is irrelevant
because the theory is true by virtue of being based on aspects of human behavior –
which in turn is true by virtue of assumptions that are based on self-evident facts of
human experience (Ibid.).

One can offer critique to the a priori method on both logical and practical
grounds. The logical criticism is aimed at the notion of ceteris paribus which Mill does
not call by name but adopts. Scientifically, such a notion is vague and untestable, or not
completely refutable by empirical testing. The practical criticism alleges that by
regarding apparent disconfirmations as the result of a disturbing cause, the a priori
method will end up justifying theories that have no practical use while in order to
conduct policy one needs to know what will happen, not what would happen if there
were no disturbing causes (Ibid.).
According to Mill, the method one should utilize in social sciences is similar to
the method used in mechanics. For instance, if one has a three-body system, it can be
divided into three two-body systems. The forces affecting the two body systems, once
aggregated, make it possible to ascertain knowledge of the way the three-body system
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operates. Inference of the joint effects of the laws involves what Mill terms
“ratiocination”. However, Mill does not take into account the fact that there may exist
relations and correlations between the laws in the more complex system that are not the
sum of those that operate in the simpler system. This means that the deduction of the
law in the complex system also relies on an assumption relating to both the laws of the
simpler system and to their relational structure that constitutes the complex system, as
an aggregation of the simpler systems. This neglects the causal role of the relations that
constitute the whole of the parts, or not taking into account social relations as relevant
factors (SEP, 2012).

To sum up Mill: the basic premises of political economy are deduced through
introspective observation (wealth is desired as opposed to work) and/or through
empirical observation ("law" of diminishing returns). Then, laws stating how specific
causal factors operate are established. Classical economists know the major causes of
economic phenomena but they are also aware that disturbing causes exist. The essence
of classical political economy is to ascertain the correctness and confirmation of its
basic premises - "laws". Finally, while a Science of Society also exists, it can only strive
to formulate empirical laws, which differ from laws of nature.
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Marx’s Political Economy
In Capital5, Marx focuses his attention on analyzing the system of production at
the current time in history – capitalism. The unique feature of capitalism is production,
enabled and based on division of labor. Production is the creation of commodities with
the aim of selling commodities on the market. Thus, for Marx, the building block of
capitalism is the commodity.
Marx6 begins Capital by defining value. In the first chapter of Capital, Marx
discerns between use value and exchange value. Use value “is conditioned by the
physical properties of the commodity…” (Marx, 1990) and “is independent of the
amount of labor required to appropriate its useful qualities.” (Ibid.). Exchange value is
a quantitative relation or proportion “in which use values of one kind exchange for use
values of another kind.” (Ibid.). For Marx, commodities are the “material bearers” of
exchange value. Marx also maintains that quantitative and qualitative features of
commodities commensurate to use and exchange values: “As use values, commodities
differ above all in quality, while as exchange values they can only differ in quantity,
and therefore do not contain an atom of use value.” (Ibid.).
Marx, reasoning dialectically, makes several more definitions in the first chapter
of Capital – for instance, from labor time, abstract labor and concrete labor are
developed and defined. Abstract labor, or social labor, is the homogeneous mass of
society’s labor rationed out in varying quantities in order to produce different
commodities. The specific forms, such as carpentry, tailoring etc. are termed concrete
labor (Sowell, 1985). For Marx, there existed an optimal amount of labor, which would

5

The following discussion of Marx’s definition of value is based on his writings in Capital.
Even though it is a crucial part for understanding Marx’s economics, I shall not go into the problem of
transformation of values into prices. For analysis see (Hollander, 2008) p. 17-22 and (Roncaglia, 2003),
chapter (16): Sraffa. I shall also not elaborate on Marx’s “Equalization of the General Rate of Profit
through Competition” (Chapter 10, Capital III) which perhaps is almost as important for understanding
competition and the market, although a brief sketch of what the market embodied to Marx appears
below. For analysis see (Hollander, 2008), p. 31-38.
6
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produce a price at equilibrium, termed by Marx as “socially necessary labor”.7 Socially
necessary labor is comprised of two distinct components - one technological and the
other economic (Ibid.). The technological component - “The labor time socially
necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of
production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time.”
The second component, the economic, defines necessary labor as “only the labor time
which is required for the satisfaction of the social need (the demand).”(Ibid.).
According to Marx, and opposing the classical economist’s conception, commodities
did not necessarily exchange proportionally to their labor cost: “Average prices do not
directly coincide with the values of the commodities, as Adam Smith, Ricardo, and
others believe.” (Marx, 1990). Abstract and concrete labor, which flow into exchange
value, develop into relative and equivalent value, which both flow into money - the
universal equivalent.8 Marx’s constructions are building blocks for his analysis and,
like the classical economists, he did not conceive of them as something that could be
proved or disproved (Sowell, 1985).
Marx’s discussion of value derives from his basic definition of the commodity,
whereas the logical developments he makes are developed as dialectical relations - one
definition flows into opposites that flow and form the base for the next set of
oppositions etc. Marx is aware of the fact that different tasks demand different qualities
from those that perform them. Per Marx: “more complex labor counts only as
intensified, or rather multiplied simple labor… In the interests of simplification, we
shall henceforth view every form of labor power as simple labor power; by doing this
we shall simply be saving ourselves the trouble of making the reduction.” (Marx, 1990).

7
8

For an explanation on the importance of this part of Marx’s analysis see (Hollander, 2008) p. 36.
For an explanation on Money, Marx’s universal equivalent, see (Ishikura, 2004) p. 89.
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Thus, and similar to Mill, Marx knowingly makes abstractions, though they are
different from Mills’ natural laws.
Marx continues: “commodities possess an objective character as values only in
so far as they are expressions of an identical social substance, human labor, that their
objective character as value is therefore purely social.” (Ibid.). In the end of Chapter 1,
The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret, Marx states “… the labor of the private
individual manifests itself as an element of the total labor of society only through the
relations which the act of exchange establishes between the products… they appear as
material relations between persons and social relations between things.” (Ibid.).
According to Marx, “value “lies hidden behind” exchange value” (Sowell,
1985). Marx makes several charges against classical economists, and against capitalism
as the current mode of production: they fail to grasp “the hidden relations between value
and its form, exchange value” (Ibid.); they confuse “the form of value with value itself”;
and they fail to discover specifically how “value becomes exchange value.” (Marx in
Sowell, 1985).
Exploitation is another feature of capitalism. In order to “prove” exploitation,
Marx discerns between labor and labor power. Labor is similar to concrete labor (a
specific productive activity) whereas labor power is the worker as a person,
incorporating the potential to exercise a productive activity (Roncaglia, 2001). The
laborer sells their labor power as a commodity and the capitalist pays for it at its value.
The costs correspond to the means of subsistence that are required to keep the worker
alive. If an economic system produces a surplus, it follows that the amount of labor
supplied by the laborers is higher than what they are paid in the form of subsistence
wages. Thus, two parts emerge – necessary labor, the labor necessary to produce the
means of subsistence for all the workers in the economy and surplus labor. The surplus
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labor is the difference between total social labor and necessary labor (Ibid.). For Marx,
exploitation is structurally built into a system with an economic surplus because
workers work more than what they receive, as embodied in their wages - exploitation
can exist even if workers receive higher wages than subsistence wages (Roemer, 2005).
One outcome of such a discrepancy is the accumulation of capital resulting from
unpaid labor. The “law of accumulation” is Marx’s exposition of the cause that leads to
the eventual collapse of capitalism. With the increase in aggregate capital, a change
also occurs in its technological composition where the “constant” capital (equipment
and raw materials) increase disproportionately to the “variable” capital (wages). This is
followed by the enactment of labor saving devices that, in turn, result in a saving of
labor accumulated in the form of unwanted laborers that comprise an “industrial reserve
army”. Combining these developments with demographic postulations of an increasing
population, it follows that the purchasing power of the laborers falls and that the market
is subject to a glut of overproduction and thus to commercial crises and depressions.
This is followed by the inevitable development and arrival of socialism by way of a
conscious class movement (Veblen, 1906).
Another concept introduced by Marx is profit upon alienation which is
represented by the following scheme: M – C – M’, with M indicating money, C
indicating commodities and M’ indicating a larger amount of money compared to M,
thus violating the rule of exchange of equals.9
For Marx, the market, while constituting a necessary place for the connection
of workers, operates in such a way that commodities become fetishes. In capitalism, the
market is necessary as it allows for the allocation of both the means of production and
the means of subsistence. These are crucial to the survival and reproduction of both

9

This will be elaborated upon when discussing the Marginal Revolution.
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individuals and for the system as a whole. Each worker contributes to the social product
with their activity, and hence to the welfare of society. However, Marx maintains that
these benevolent traits are obscured and hidden for they are diverted from their true end
by commodity fetishism. Marx’s conclusion is based on his postulation that in
capitalism the market makes it appear as though the ultimate end of every individual is
ownership of exchange values. However, society suffers from social stratification
because the productive processes are controlled by capitalists, as opposed to belonging
to society as a whole (Roncaglia, 2001).

According to Mill’s typology of the sociological sciences, the reciprocal
relation between Marx’s study of society and investigation of capitalism are
intertwined, thus they cross the borders of what he defined as two distinct modes of
political speculation. Mill claimed that laws could only be discerned in political
economy, whereas in the study of society only empirical regularities could be arrived
at. Laws had tendencies, but these were correct only insofar as they were laws of nature.
Empirical regularities were not laws, thus, repeating Mill’s quote, a “misconception
consists in supposing that the order of succession which we may be able to trace amount
the different states of society and civilization which history presents to us… could ever
amount to a law of nature” (Mill, 2006). Marx combines his theory’s laws into the study
of society. Marx would disregard Mill’s critique as Marx could claim that his postulates
merely serve him as a starting point in his analysis of the first approximation in Capital
and, as such, they were not conceived of as a theory that could be proved or disproved.
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The Marginal Revolution
In 1875, John Elliot Cairnes would sum up the essence of classical political
economy in his “Character and Logical Method of Political Economy". This is fifty
years after the death of Ricardo but the basic tenets on which classical political
economy rested remained intact. In his book, Cairnes concludes that "[Economic laws]
can be refuted only by showing either that the principles and conditions assumed do not
exist, or that the tendency which the law affirms does not follow as a necessary
consequence from this assumption" (Cairnes as quoted in Blaug, 1992). In Senior, in
Mill, in Cairnes and in Jevons, verification does not mean testing the validity of a
theory. Verification is only a method of establishing a boundary to the application of a
theory deemed true. The only reason to conduct an a posteriori test is in order to
discover whether disturbing causes exist. If they do, then the theory was applied
wrongly but the theory itself is true. An even stronger statement can be made about the
perception of economic science at the time: the question of whether there was any way
of showing a logically consistent theory to be false was never even contemplated (Ibid.).
This period also represents the beginning of the "marginal revolution".10 The
marginal revolution would set the stage for shifting the focus of economics from macro
to micro. For example, economists became more interested in analyzing firm behavior
in competition as opposed to trying to understand the economy as a whole. This was
made possible by combining Utilitarianism and mathematics. So, while Mill, and other
classical economists, knew about and acknowledged market failures they did not have
rigorous enough tools to develop their thoughts. Working around the turn of the century,
Marshal would introduce a more rigorous discussion of externalities based on marginal
utility because by that time he had the tools to do so. Externalities can be positive or

10Similar

to the "industrial revolution", it took about sixty years for the revolution to fully materialize.
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negative, and they represent repercussions of decisions made by individuals or firms
that are not taken into account when decisions are made. Pigou, Marshal’s successor at
Cambridge, would lay the groundwork for the modern field of environmental
economics in the 1920’s by formalizing the concept of externalities in consumption.
Pigou distinguished between private and social marginal net products. Practically
speaking, this means that a factory that emits smoke and harms consumers imposes a
social marginal cost on the community in excess of its private marginal cost (Sandmo,
2014). To fix this, one may impose a tax on polluting that would affect the incentives
that the firm faces. This, in turn, may lead the firm to recalculate how much harm it
causes because it now must take into account higher production costs. Another way to
think about this is to think about driving. Cars need gas but cars also harm the
environment. By applying a tax on gas, an individual consumer must consider a higher
cost when using their car, which, under certain assumptions about behavior, will lead
them to use it less. Such a policy instrument is known as a Pigouvian tax.
The marginal revolution was so important that it warranted a new name for
classical economics - neo-classical economics. One way to understand neo-classical
economics is to think of it as the "science of exchange". This means that it addresses
all economic phenomena in the same manner: it reduces the problem to one of
exchange, and it then searches for the equilibrium exchange ratio. Neo-classical
economics represents the utility theory of value supplanting the labor theory of value.
It also meant that a purely subjective perception of value was introduced into economics
and it allowed for a broadening of the scope of economics for it was no longer bound
to the parsimonious labor theory of value. However, it also ushered in an alteration in
the metaphysical perception of both things and activity, which influenced and changed
economics, and society, deeply.
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According to Miekle11 (Maki, 2001), the English language has been penetrated
by economic or market conceptions. “Things” are naturally occurring entities or
artifacts, which persist through change and whose identities are bound to a continuous
path that can be traced through time (Ibid.). Value in use is a notion that served as a
base in the work of Smith, Ricardo and Marx. As such, it was commensurate with the
idea of an artifact or of a useful thing. Mill, as quoted earlier, started to obscure the
distinction between value in use and value in exchange, and Jevons later shifted the
focus of value from usefulness in consumption to usefulness in buying and selling
(Ibid.). Eventually, the notion of value in use was replaced by the notion of utility.
These shifts also mirror the developments in scientific thought that were
occurring at the time (to be elaborated upon below). Jevons thought that the presence
of qualitative notions in economics was wrong and that they stood in the way of
quantification. Thus, he introduced utility as the notion of usefulness. However, utility
is severed from the idea of a thing or artifact and it is generic and uncategorized.
Usefulness and utility are an economic construct and they can be common to all things.
Usefulness becomes uniform and homogenous, just like money or exchange value usefulness in use is subordinated to usefulness in exchange, or buying and selling
(Ibid.).
Marshall, at the turn of the century, asserts that:
“The word value says Adam Smith has two different meanings, and sometimes
expresses the utility of some particular object and sometimes the power of purchasing
other goods which the possession of that object conveys. But experience has shown that
it is not well to use the word in the former sense. The value, that is the exchange value,
of one thing in terms of another at any place and time, is the amount of that second
thing which can be got there and then in exchange for the first. Thus the term value is
relative, and expresses the relation between two things at a particular place and time”.
(Ibid.).

11This part, until Keynes’s quote, including the quotes as they appear within, is almost completely based
on Miekle, Scott, “Quality and Quantity in Economics: the Metaphysical Construction of the Economic
Realm”, in (Maki, 2001).
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Marx, as mentioned, made the distinction between the qualitative and
quantitative features of the commodity (value in use versus value in exchange).
However, Wicksteed argued that the concept of utility has made such discernment
redundant: “What we really have to do is to put out of consideration the concrete and
specific qualitative utilities in which they [useful things] differ, leaving only the abstract
and general quantitative utility in which they are exchanged.” (Ibid.)
This alteration in notions changes the framing of questions. For instance, what
is the end of the market economy? Marx and John Maynard Keynes held that the end
of the market system is the accumulation of money as opposed to the accumulation of
things (Ibid.). If utility is the only end then such a distinction, even if wrong, cannot be
made within its framework. For example, Keynes wrote that the national dividend
“measures the volume of current output or real income and not the value of output or
money income.” It depends on net output and “on the net addition... to the resources of
the community available for consumption.” (Ibid.).
Keynes was also concerned with wealth as money:
“The distinction between a cooperative economy and an entrepreneur economy
bears some resemblance to a pregnant observation made by Karl Marx, - though the
subsequent use to which he put this observation was highly illogical. He pointed out
that the nature of production in the actual world is not, as economists seem to suppose,
a case of C – M – C’, i.e. of exchanging commodity (or effort) for money in order to
obtain another commodity (or effort). That may be the standpoint of the private
consumer. But it is not the attitude of business, which is a case of M - C – M’, i.e. of
parting with money for commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money.” (Ibid).
Marx borrowed that distinction from Aristotle who made it the basis of his
analysis of the market economy. According to Aristotle, actions are defined by their
ends, thus if two activities have different ends they are different activities. C – M – C’
aims at getting useful things whereas M – C – M’ is pursued for the sake of money. The
second behavior has no natural end. There is no difference of quality between one sum
of money and another, the only difference is that of quantity. To Aristotle, the second
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mode means that: “there is no limit to the end it seeks… the end it seeks is the mere
acquisition of money.” (Ibid.) Through this lens, there is no ability to discern between
reproducible or non-reproducible goods, all fall into one category usurped by utility.
John Neville Keynes's "The Scope and Method of Political Economy" (1891)
was also published during this era. In it, he makes the distinction between a positive
and a normative study of economics. This distinction is important in order to understand
the way that neo-classical economists perceive economic science and themselves. In
order to do so he gives the following example:
"Thus, in regard to the payment of interest, we have, first, the positive inquiries
why, under certain conditions of industry, interest is paid at all, and what determines
the rate paid. We have, secondly, the inquiries whether interest ought to be paid, and,
if it ought, what constitutes a fair rate of interest… Intimate as are the connexions
between the above kinds of inquiry, they are in themselves distinct in character, and
belong to different departments in the classification of knowledge. The first belongs to
positive science, the second to normative or regulative science… As the terms here are
used, a positive science may be defined as a body of systematized knowledge
concerning what is; a normative or regulative science as a body of systematized
knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to be, and concerned therefore with the
ideal as distinguished from the actual; an art as a system of rules for the attainment of
a given end." (Keynes, 1917).
The developments above, together with developments in scientific thought, set
the stage for understanding the evolution of environmental economics as we know it
today.
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Developments in Scientific Thought and Their Effect on Economic Thought
Important developments in scientific thought are also occurring at the turn of
the 20th century. Three developments that would influence economic thought are those
of Mach, Duhem and Hempel.
According to Mach, the purpose of science is to give the most economical
description of nature as possible, for the goal of science is to provide conceptions which
can help one better orient oneself to the world: "in short a world picture of the greatest
possible stability." (SEP, 2012). Mach asserted that all scientific theories and
hypotheses are condensed descriptions of natural events, neither true nor false in
themselves but simply conventions for storing empirical information (Blaug, 1992).
Duhem maintained that: "The analysis we have given of experiments in physics shows
fact to be completely interpenetrated by theoretical interpretation, to the point where it
becomes impossible to express fact in isolation from theory." (SEP, 2012). Duhem
posited that no individual scientific hypothesis is conclusively falsifiable for one cannot
separate the particular hypothesis from its auxiliary statements (Blaug, 1992). This
argument is known as the Duhem-Quine thesis. Popper's scientific method, introduced
into economics by Hutchison, combined with the hypothetico-deductive method (HD)
(explanation follows) of scientific explanation was formulated in order to deal with this
problem.
Hempel was the first to formalize the HD model for the testing of scientific
theories. Hempel and Oppenheim stated that all truly scientific explanations have a
logical structure: they involve at least one universal law plus a statement of relevant
initial or boundary conditions that constitute the explanans or premises from which the
explanandum – a statement about an event, whose explanation one is seeking - is
deduced with the rules of deductive logic. Moreover, from the common logical structure
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of scientific explanation, it follows that the operation called explanation involves the
same rules of logical inference as the operation of prediction - the difference being the
relative time of the event, with regard to the time of the hypothesis. In other words,
citing a particular cause as an explanation of an event simply demands placing the event
in question under some universal law. In the case of prediction, one starts with a
universal law plus a set of initial conditions, from them one deduces a statement about
an unknown event. The prediction is used in order to see whether the universal law is
in fact upheld. According to this approach, explanation is prediction written backwards.
This is also known as the symmetry thesis or the covering law of model of explanation
(Blaug, 1992).
Another major change in scientific thought occurred with regard to the way the
scientific method should proceed. As mentioned, Mill's method a priori rested on laws
deduced from introspection. The HD method came to replace this older notion and
introduced a new commitment to empiricism. Mill's method only utilized the method a
posteriori in order to verify that all disturbing causes had been taken into account
whereas the HD method demands empirical confirmation or non-confirmation of an
hypothesis.
The first step in the HD method is to formulate an hypothesis. The second is to
deduce a "prediction" or observable claim conjoined with other statements. These
statements should include descriptions of initial conditions, other theories and ceteris
paribus clauses. Following, one tests by experimentation or by observation. Finally,
one must judge if the hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed. This is dependent on
whether the initial prediction is true or false. "Confirmed" does not mean "proven" or
"true" and "disconfirmed" does not mean "disproven" or "false". This method preceded
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the logical positivists but came to be a central feature of their program (Hausman,
1992).
The HD method allows one to formulate the problems of theory assessment in
economics. For instance, in order to test the economic hypothesis of the law of demand,
which states that a change in the price of the commodity causes (ceteris paribus) a
change in the quantity demanded in the opposite direction, then one could test this
hypothesis on the price of gasoline by conducting an experiment and verifying that if
the price of gasoline goes up people will demand less of it. This is based on (a) the law
of demand (b) a statement describing a price change (c) ceteris paribus assumptions
and (d) assumptions about the reliability of the statistical data one is using. Following,
one observes whether the prediction is true. A major problem in economics arises with
regard to the last step, deciding whether the evidence supports the hypothesis, for in
economics various disturbing causes exist (Ibid.).
In 1938, Terence Hutchison published "The Significance and Basic Postulates
of Economic Theory". With it came the explicit introduction into economics of Popper's
methodological criterion of falsifiability. This meant that for an economic proposition
to aspire to the status of "science" it must, at least conceivably, be put to an empirical
test (Blaug, 1992). This came as a retort to the method a priori, which was still
advanced by various economists including Mises and Robbins who continued to stress
the importance of the method a priori. Robbins, in "An Essay on the Nature and
Significance of Economic Science" argues that:
"The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific theory, are obviously
deductions from a series of postulates… The main postulate of the theory of value is
the fact that individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so…
The main postulate of the theory of dynamics is the fact that we are not certain regarding
future scarcities. These are not postulates the existence of whose counterpart in reality
admits of extensive dispute once their nature is fully realized. We do not need controlled
experiments to establish their validity: they are so much the stuff of our everyday
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experience that they have only to be stated to be recognized as obvious" (Robbins,
1984).

At the center of Hutchison's argument is the notion that all economic
propositions can and should be classified either into tautological propositions or into
empirical ones. This goes hand in hand with the positivist's idea that all statements can
be divided into logically necessary – "analytic" propositions, and logically
indeterminate – "synthetic" ones. Hutchison's methodological prescription is that
scientific economic enquiries should be confined to empirically testable statements.
Given, he is vague on the question of whether the requirement of testability refers to
the assumptions or to the predictions of economic theory (Blaug, 1992).
This is another key point in time in the transformation of the method and basic
postulations of economics. Mill’s method a priori is based on assumptions, or laws,
and proving or disproving them is irrelevant to the basic premises that they are laws,
therefore they are true. Empirical testing only highlights the fact that disturbing causes
exist but serves as no basis for refuting or disproving the underlying theory. On the
other hand, Hutchison is advocating a purely positivist demand on economics.
Reconciliation of economics with Popper's idea of falsification and with the HD
method and with the Duhem-Quine thesis is brought about by one of the most important
methodological statements written in economics,12 Milton Friedman's essay "The
Methodology of Positive Economics" (Friedman, 1966).
Prior to Friedman's essay, various economists tried to conduct empirical
experiments to verify basic economic tenets. For instance, Lester tried to determine
whether firms attempt to maximize expected returns. These tests attracted attention and

12According

to Hausman, Freidman's essay, "The Methodology of Positive Economics" is by far the
most influential methodological statement of this century. It is the only essay on methodology that a
large number, perhaps a majority, of economists have ever read." (Hausman, 1992).
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provoked angry responses. Friedman's essay appeared to offer a way out of such
empirical difficulties and criticism (Hausman, 1992).
After distinguishing between positive and normative economics, as Keynes did,
Friedman asserts that the role of a positive science is exclusively predictive, as opposed
to the symmetry thesis, which views explanation as prediction and vice versa.
Moreover, Friedman claims that economists seek significant and useable predictions,
not understanding or explanation (Ibid.). Thus, for Friedman, economics as a science
should be instrumental. A theory, which enables one to make a reliable prediction, is a
good theory. According to Friedman, there is no other test of a theory. For example, it
does not matter whether its "assumptions" are "unrealistic" (Hausman, 2008). When
Friedman mentions assumptions, he means both fundamental assertions (consumers
maximize utility) and additional premises (cigarettes of different brands are perfect
substitutes). An unrealistic assumption could mean that the basic assertion may not be
true, perhaps not even approximately true, with regard to the phenomena to which the
theory is applied to. Friedman can then argue that researchers such as Lester are
mistaken when they attempt to assess the assumptions of economic theory instead of its
predictions. There is no point in examining assumptions of a theory if it is possible to
do a "total" assessment of its performance with respect to the phenomena it was
designed to explain (Ibid).13 Thus, by the 1950s, political economy, now called
economics, completed a full turn. In one hundred years, it went from a method wishing
to ascertain the correctness and confirmation of its basic premises - "laws", to a science
of prediction.
Koopmans sums up these developments with regard to the assessment of theory:

13This perspective is problematic in many ways and as such it received much critique. For two critiques
see Hausman, "Why Look Under the Hood?" and Simon, "Testability and Approximation", both in
Hausman (2008).
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"Whether the postulates are placed beyond doubt [Robbins], or whether doubts
concerning their realism are suppressed by the assertion that verification can and should
be confined to the hard-to-unravel more distant effects [Friedman] – in either case the
argument surrounds and shields received economic theory with an appearance of
invulnerability which is neither fully justified nor at all needed. The theories that have
become dear to us can very well stand by themselves as an impressive and highly
valuable system of deductive thought, erected on a few premises that seem to be wellchosen first approximations to a complicated reality. They exhibit in a striking manner
the power of deductive reasoning in drawing conclusions which, to the extent one
accepts their premises, are highly relevant to questions of economic policy. In many
cases the knowledge these deductions yield is the best we have, either because better
approximations have not been secured at the level of the premises, or because
comparable reasoning from premises recognized as more realistic has not been
completed or has not yet been found possible. Is any stronger defense needed, or even
desirable?" (Koopmans, 1957).
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Environmental and Ecological Economics
Mill’s writing acknowledged the problem of supplying public goods as well as
the importance of the environment. Per Mill:
“…is there the earth itself, its forests and waters, and all other natural riches,
above and below the surface? These are the inheritance of the human race, and there
must be regulations for the common enjoyment of it. What rights, and under what
conditions, a person shall be allowed to exercise over any portion of this common
inheritance cannot be left undecided. No function of government is less optional than
the regulation of these things, or more completely involved in the idea of civilized
society.” (Mill, 2004)

With that, as described earlier, it took quite a while from the time of his writing
to develop the framework that enables economists to deal with environmental
questions. In fact, economic literature, until the middle of the 20th century, had little to
no concern for resource depletion or environmental issues (Spash, 1999). While it did
develop ideas relating to conservation issues in agriculture and forestry, it considered
those from a wise-use perspective as opposed to preservation. Agricultural economics
developed during this period, and it produced, for example, work on soil conservation.
Mainstream neo-classical economics, however, developed theories that assumed that
economies could operate independently of natural resource constraints so
environmental issues were marginalized (Ibid.).
It is only in the last four decades that economics has shown interest in the
reciprocal relationship between economic activity and the environment. Two categories
of environmental issues have been at the center of environmental economics. The first
is the depletion of natural resources and the second is pollution (Lumby, 2007).
Hotelling, in 1931, introduced his theory of the mine in which he described
optimal non-renewable resource depletion (Spash, 1999). However, it would take
several decades for Hotelling’s approach to discounting to become accepted. The key
concept in his theory is that depletion is defined as follows: the opportunity cost of what
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you extract today is production at a future date. According to his model, if one assumes
competition and if the social rate of discount equals the market rate of interest then
there would not be over extraction of resources. Asking the question of what is the
optimal rate of resource exploitation highlights two key economic concepts, common
property and uncertainty (Lumby, 2007). Both are important because in the case of
common property there will be a tendency to over extract, exacerbated by uncertainty
regarding the future. When looking to policy instruments to curb over extraction,
Pigouvian taxation, as elaborated upon earlier, is one method that can alter the
calculations firms face.
Pollution is usually given as the classic example of negative externalities. As
discussed earlier, rational polluters will not factor pollution into their production costs.
Such a scenario is defined as a market failure because there is no market price
mechanism that can assist in regulation. This problem arises in the supply of “public
goods” more generally because everyone can enjoy them but without enforcement, no
one will pay for them. Most economists would recommend applying Pigouvian taxation
though practically speaking ascertaining the accurate amount of taxes to impose can be
difficult (Ibid.).
Much criticism can be made when applying the economic worldview to social
questions. However, Oates claims that economics actually provides useful insights
relevant to environmental protection (Oates, 2005). The first is that economic analysis
is quite clear about the fact that an unregulated market system will lead to excessive
pollution. This happens because the market allows for “overuse” of the environment. It
follows that an economic argument could be made for intervention through
environmental regulation. Economics can also provide helpful tools to calculate
possible answers to the question of how clean should the environment be. This is
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possible because micro economic theory focuses on equalizing marginal benefits to
marginal costs. In any case, even if marginal analysis is not used towards this end,
economics can provide helpful insights into possible results of public policy (bid.).
Marx also considered the environment, albeit in a different way. Per Marx:
“Capitalist production…disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the
earth, i.e. prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in
the form of food and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting
fertility of the soil…. The social combination and organization of the labor processes
is turned into an organized mode of crushing out the workman’s individual vitality,
freedom and independence.… Moreover, all progress in capitalist agriculture is a
progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress
in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress towards ruining the
more long-lasting sources of that fertility. The more a country starts its development on
the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for example, the more rapid
is this process of destruction. Capitalist production, therefore, develops
technology…only by sapping the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the
worker.” (Marx, 1990)
An interesting connection can be between Marx’s critique of capitalism and the
growth of ecological economics over the last few decades. According to Costanza
(quoted in Lumby, 2007), ecological economics “is intended to be a new approach to
both ecology and economics, that recognizes the need to make economics more
cognizant of ecological impacts and dependencies, the need to make ecology more
sensitive to economic forces, incentives and constraints, and the need to treat integrated
economic-ecological systems with a common (but diverse) set of conceptual and
analytical tools.”
While there are various strands within ecological economics, two tenets
distinguish it from neo-classical economics. Ecological economics recognizes that
humans and their social spheres, including the economy, are part of a larger natural
ecosystem, the earth’s biosphere. This means that the environment is not a subset of the
economy but that the economy is a subset of the global environment (Harris, quoted in
Lumby, 2007). The second tenet that distinguishes it from neo-classical economics
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relates to the question of whether unlimited economic growth is attainable, or whether
the more achievable goal should be a “steady state” economy (Daly as quoted in
Lumby, 2007).
Ecological economics could be characterized as a movement and less so a clear
cut discipline because its interdisciplinary requirements make it difficult to define its
core methodology. According to Holling et al (quoted in Spash, 1999), four key features
are common to the structure of ecosystems that economists should take into account.
These are:
-

Change is episodic as opposed to continuous and gradual (i.e. hurricanes)

-

Moving from micro to macro is not a linear process

-

Ecosystems may have numerous equilibria, they may lack equilibria or they
may be destabilized by forces that are far from equilibria.

-

Due to these complexities, management and policies must be flexible

Additional features that ecological economics espouses are the importance that it
assigns to incorporating moral values into the discussion. This includes debating the set
of morally considerable entities, what rights do future generations have and how the
poor should be treated (Spash, 1999). Applying economic analysis to such questions is
difficult, but the moral and philosophical essence of economics, Utilitarianism, does
provide a coherent outlook on such issues. However, many economists perceive of
themselves as engineers who solve problems and do not necessarily take such
considerations into account, nor do they think of the discipline as actually holding a
moral position on such issues.
According to Lumby (2007), the emergence of ecological economics can be seen
as a macro-economic complement to the helpful microeconomic foundations of
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environmental economics. Ecological economics, which at its base is interdisciplinary,
can also be seen as an attempt to collect different elements that share a common purpose
and try to answer a similar question: what are the ways in which the demand of the
modern economy can be combined with the bio-physical constraints that are inherent
in the environment in which we live in?
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Conclusion
This paper set out to try and answer the question of how does economics study
the environment? In order to provide a partial answer to this question, it described the
different outlook between classical and neo-classical economists regarding value. It
also examined and contrasted the economic approaches of Marx and Mill, whose way
of thinking about social phenomena is still very relevant today. It also highlighted the
changes in scientific thought that occurred at the turn of the 20th century and how they
affected economics.
When these disparate aspects of economic thought and their development are
taken together it becomes clearer why and how the environment is considered when
economic analyses is applied to it. This is the case both in terms of explaining
phenomena and in terms of the policy tools that economic theory and application offer.
It also becomes clearer how analysis of the environment developed over the last couple
of centuries and that each development was based on previous modes of thought. There
is surely much more that can be discerned about my question by further research and
reading into the history of economic thought.
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